Sarah Felson L&S Social Sciences
Responsibility for Nonvoluntary Mental States
This project explores and develops upon the contemporary literature in moral philosophy to investigate whether and how we should be held morally responsible for our nonvoluntary mental states, such as our beliefs, attitudes, and judgments of the world. There is a common intuition that our actions are only available for moral assessment insofar as they are voluntary. For example, I would undoubtedly be blameworthy for tripping a passerby if I voluntarily stick out my leg, but not if my leg jerks out due to a sudden muscle cramp. However, unlike our actions, our mental states are often not voluntary; e.g., we cannot make ourselves genuinely believe something just by choosing to believe it. In my research, I will first investigate how one may be responsible for mental states, given their nonvoluntary nature. Then, I will analyze what responsibility for mental states suggests for the appropriateness of moral responses such as praise and blame. Overall, I aim to develop the contemporary discourse regarding the social and normative importance of holding one another responsible for nonvoluntary mental states.
Message To Sponsor
Thank you so incredibly much for your support of my research. I am immensely grateful for this opportunity to focus my time and attention on such a fascinating and puzzling topic in moral philosophy. Through my time at Berkeley, I have gained a rigorous philosophical education that has provided me the inspiration and resources to undertake a philosophical project of my own. It is an unimaginable privilege to receive such generous support to pursue this project.